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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-1626 
 
WAYNE R. HARTRANFT, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner 
Social Security Administration 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
Civil Action No. 97-cv-04039 
District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 12, 1999 
 
Before: Becker, McKee, Circuit Judges 
Lee, District Judge* 
 
(Filed: May 18, 1999) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*The Honorable Donald J. Lee, United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
Wayne R. Hartranft, appeals the District Court's 
affirmance of the Commissioner of Social Security's 
conclusion that Hartranft is not entitled to disability 
insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. SS 401-433. For the reasons that follow, we 
will affirm. 
 
I. Procedural History and Standard of Review  
 
Hartranft applied for DIB on May 3, 1994, alleging 
disability since January 29, 1990, due to numerous 
incidences of pain related to a back injury he suffered while 
working as a truck driver. In his application, he alleged 
disability due to back injury, neck pain, hernia, anxiety and 
depression. His application was initially denied, and denied 
again upon reconsideration. 
 
Hartranft appealed the denial and was afforded a de novo 
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ found 
that Hartranft had residual functional capacity 1 for the full 
range of light work,2 diminished by his inability to bend 
repeatedly. The ALJ thus concluded that, although 
Hartranft had been injured, he was not "disabled" within 
the meaning of the Act at any time through December 31, 
1995, the date his insured status expired. 
 
On April 25, 1997, the Appeals Council denied 
Hartranft's request for review of the ALJ's decision, 
concluding that the ALJ's findings were supported by 
substantial evidence and that the ALJ committed no abuse 
of discretion or error of law. Consequently, the ALJ's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "Residual functional capacity" is defined as that which an individual 
is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her 
impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. S 404.1545(a). 
 
2. "Light work" is defined as work that involves lifting no more than 20 
pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects that weigh 
up to 10 pounds. 20 C.F.R. S 404.1567(b). 
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decision was the Commissioner's final decision on 
Hartranft's DIB claim. 
 
Having exhausted his administrative remedies, Hartranft 
brought an action in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking judicial review 
of the Commissioner's final decision. The matter was 
initially referred to a Magistrate Judge who issued a Report 
and Recommendation in favor of the Commissioner. 
Thereafter, the District Court adopted that Report and 
Recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor 
of the Commissioner. This appeal followed. 
 
Our review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited 
to determining whether that decision is supported by 
substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. S 405 (g); Monsour 
Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d. Cir. 
1986). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or 
considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant 
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion." Pierce v. Underwood , 108 S.Ct. 
2541, 2545 (1988). See also, Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 
1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). We will not set the 
Commissioner's decision aside if it is supported by 
substantial evidence, even if we would have decided the 
factual inquiry differently. See 42 U.S.C.S 405 (g); Monsour 
Medical Center, 806 F.2d at 1190-91. 
 
II. Facts  
 
Hartranft sustained a work-related injury on November 
20, 1989, while employed as a long-haul trucker by 
Ashland Chemical Company. Thereafter, Hartranft was 
examined by Raymond D. LaBarre, D.C., a chiropractor, 
because of complaints of lower back pain. LaBarre 
diagnosed Hartranft as having "acute sciatic neuralgia of 
L4, L5." (R. 101, 111). During a follow-up examination on 
December 27, 1989, LaBarre advised Hartranft "not to do 
anything heavy or any long distance truck driving as is his 
normal occupation." (R. 101). LaBarre also opined that 
Hartranft could work "relatively light duty." Id. 
 
Richard K. White, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, examined 
Hartranft on February 28, 1990. Dr. White's examination 
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revealed limited motion of the lumbar spine. However, 
Hartranft's station, stance, and gait were normal, and 
Hartranft had no specific abnormalities associated with his 
gait. He did experience some problems with his feet and 
raising his leg, but his toe and heel walking were normal 
and showed no evidence of muscle weakness. No other 
abnormalities were noted. 
 
At the request of LaBarre, Hartranft was also examined 
by Charles R. Reina, M.D., Board-certified orthopedic 
surgeon, on May 25, 1990. Dr. Reina's report stated that 
Hartranft was able to walk without limp or complaint, and 
with a normal gait. His range of motion in both hips was 
full and without pain, and his neurological examination 
was normal. Upon re-examination on December 10, 1990, 
Dr. Reina again found no neurological abnormalities. The 
medical opinions of Dr. Reina do not "corroborate" 
LaBarre's findings, as Hartranft alleges. (Appellant's Br. at 
24-25). To the contrary, Dr. Reina stated in his report that, 
based on his examinations of Hartranft, he couldfind none 
of the neurological abnormalities found by LaBarre. (R. 
135). 
 
LaBarre issued a report dated March 21, 1991, 
summarizing Hartranft's treatment to date, and indicating 
a "final diagnosis" of degenerative changes of the disc at L4- 
L5 and L5-S1, slight central disc bulging at L4-L5, and a 
small central disc herniation at L5-S1. (R. 118). In his 
report LaBarre opined that Hartranft would be unable to 
work "in any occupation where he has to bend, twist or lift, 
or in any occupation where he would have to stand or sit 
for any protracted period of time." (R. 119). LaBarre also 
opined that, "the accident of November 20, 1989, was the 
cause and is presently the cause of Mr. Hartranft's 
disability and injuries." Id. 
 
On May 20, 1994, Frederick D. Burton, M.D. examined 
Hartranft at the request of LaBarre. Dr. Burton 
recommended that Hartranft continue with chiropractic 
care until his pain decreased and that he not return to his 
pre-injury job without restriction. 
 
LaBarre continued to provide chiropractic care to 
Hartranft through November 1995. On February 10, 1996, 
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Hartranft returned to LaBarre's office complaining that he 
had experienced increased pain and discomfort since 
concluding his treatment three months earlier. LaBarre 
found some muscle weakness and continued degenerative 
disc disease, and urged Hartranft to continue chiropractic 
care. 
 
At the hearing before the ALJ, Hartranft testified that he 
continued to work for more than two months following his 
November 1989 injury. (R. 32). He stated that he took only 
non-prescription Tylenol for his pain, adding that he did 
not like to take "pain killers" because they were addictive. 
(R. 28, 37, 39). He testified that he had a prescription from 
Dr. Burton for his "nerves" but nothing for pain. He also 
testified that LaBarre had him walking for exercise and 
doing light back strengthening exercises, but that he did 
not walk or exercise once worker's compensation stopped 
paying his medical bills. 
 
Hartranft further testified that, despite his injuries, he 
attempted to go back to light duty work with his employer 
but was told they could not use him anymore. He also 
testified about a daily routine that included walking his 
daughter to the bus stop, helping his wife with the dishes, 
grocery shopping, driving a car, bathing, and dressing 
himself without assistance. (R. 48). In his May 3, 1994, 
Disability Report, Hartranft gave a similar description of the 
level of activity he was capable of engaging in, including 
visiting friends and relatives, walking, exercising, and 
helping with cooking. 
 
The ALJ found that Hartranft did have a severe lumbar 
disc impairment and was unable to return to his past 
relevant work as a truck driver. (R.18, Findings Nos. 3, 6). 
The ALJ further found that Hartranft had the residual 
functional capacity for the full range of light work, 
diminished by his inability to bend repeatedly, and was 
thus not disabled under the Act. (R. 18-19, Findings Nos. 
7, 11, 12). 
 
III. Discussion 
 
Hartranft relies, in part, upon evidence he introduced 
regarding his chiropractor's opinion of Hartranft's disability 
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to argue that the ALJ's determination is not supported by 
substantial evidence, and that the ALJ did not give the 
chiropractor's opinion adequate weight. 
 
However, a chiropractor's opinion is not "an acceptable 
medical source" entitled to controlling weight. C.F.R. 
S 416.913 defines "acceptable source" for purposes of our 
inquiry as: 
 
       (1) Licensed physicians; 
 
       (2) Licensed osteopaths; 
 
       (3) Licensed or certified psychologists; 
 
       (4) Licensed optometrists for the measurement of 
       visual acuity and visual fields . . . . and 
 
       (5) Persons authorized to send . . . a copy or 
       summary of the medical records of a hospital, clinic, 
       sanitorium, medical institution, or health care facility. 
       . . . 
 
       (6) A report of an interdisciplinary team that contains 
       the evaluation and signature of an acceptable medical 
       source is also considered acceptable medical evidence. 
 
See also Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d 307, 313 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Wolfe v. Shalala, 997 F.2d 321, 327 (7th Cir. 1993); Walker 
v. Shalala, 993 F.2d 630, 632 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); Lee v. 
Sullivan, 945 F.2d 687, 691 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). 
Although DIB eligibility can not rest upon the opinion of a 
chiropractor, a hearing examiner can consider  a 
chiropractor's opinion, along with all of the other evidence 
that a claimant may present insofar as it is deemed 
relevant to assessing a claimant's disability. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 416.913(e)(3) ("information from other sources may also 
help us to understand how your impairment(s) affects your 
ability to work. Other sources include, . . . (3) Other 
practitioners for example, chiropractors") (internal 
parentheses omitted). 
 
Here, examinations by three board certified physicians 
failed to corroborate LaBarre's opinion of the extent of 
Hartranft's disability. None of these doctors identified the 
neurological abnormalities reported by LaBarre. Moreover, 
Hartranft's own account of the activities he was able to 
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perform was consistent with the medical observations of 
those three board certified physicians, and inconsistent 
with the degree of limitation that LaBarre reported. 3 
 
Hartranft cites a report from Dr. Richard K. White, in 
which Dr. White stated that Hartranft should not be 
released for any kind of work. This report, however, was 
made in connection with Hartranft's workers compensation 
claim, not his DIB claim. We have previously recognized the 
different standards for determining disability under these 
two programs. See Coria v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 245, 247 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (noting that "the ALJ could reasonably disregard 
so much of the physicians' reports as set forth their 
conclusions as to worker compensation claims."). Here, the 
ALJ recognized the limited significance of Dr. White's 
report. 
 
Finally, Hartranft argues that the ALJ failed to take 
account of his subjective symptoms, including pain, in 
determining that he could still perform the full range of 
light work. The ALJ determined that Hartranft had a 
discernible medical condition that could cause his pain, but 
that his statements concerning his pain and its impact on 
his ability to work were not entirely credible in light of the 
entire record. 
 
Allegations of pain and other subjective symptoms must 
be supported by objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1529. Once an ALJ concludes that a medical 
impairment that could reasonably cause the alleged 
symptoms exists, he or she must evaluate the intensity and 
persistence of the pain or symptom, and the extent to 
which it affects the individual's ability to work. This 
obviously requires the ALJ to determine the extent to which 
a claimant is accurately stating the degree of pain or the 
extent to which he or she is disabled by it. See 20 C.F.R. 
S 404.1529(c). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Hartranft concedes that the ALJ need not be bound by the 
chiropractor's opinion, but argues that the ALJ erred in not relying upon 
the chiropractor's evaluation to corroborate the opinions of Dr. Reina 
and Dr. Burton. Appellant's Br. at 24. However, for the reasons we have 
recounted, we do not believe that the ALJ's treatment of the 
chiropractor's opinion was inappropriate. 
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Here, the ALJ concluded that Hartranft had a discernible 
medical condition that could reasonably cause the pain 
Hartranft complained of. However, the ALJ thought that 
Hartranft's testimony about the extent of his pain was 
exaggerated, and that Hartranft could perform light duty 
work despite his complaints of incapacitating pain. That 
ruling is clearly supported by substantial evidence in this 
record. The ALJ cited specific instances where Hartranft's 
complaints about pain and other subjective symptoms were 
inconsistent with: 1) the objective medical evidence of 
record; 2) Hartranft's testimony as to his rehabilitation and 
medication regimen; and 3) Hartranft's own description of 
his daily activities. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the District Court 
upholding the ALJ's decision. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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